Synthetic DNA technology is about to go mainstream and that will make it very difficult to control what is done with it.
In principle, it is enough to enter Twist Bioscience, upload the sequence we want and, a couple of weeks later, collect our personalized synthetic DNA from our mailbox at home. Since nine cents for each base pair. Five or six more years ago that same pair of bases would have cost at least ten times more.
This, a priori, is good news: the democratization of these technologies will allow more and more institutions to investigate the ins and outs of DNA in the face of a health and food revolution that we are already beginning to see. However, as this occurs, it is increasingly difficult for me to fall into the wrong hands.
Print DNA?
Yes, literally, in fact. Today’s technology prints inkjet bases on a glass slide and then they are assembled in an automated way. The result is a synthetic DNA sequence that can be fed into bacteria, yeast, fungi, or other different cells to turn them into miniature factories.
In this way, the synthetic DNA industry is manufacturing about 3 billion letters a year with the idea of building a permanent source of useful compounds in drugs and food products. With this technology, we can even create new proteins and design materials that have never been seen before. The potential is almost limitless.
A great power …
In this sense, the famous virologist and synthetic geneticist Benjamin Parker, pointed out that “great power requires great responsibility.” As technology becomes simpler and cheaper, our actual ability to control its use fades.
And this worries investigators and, above all, those responsible for national security. We must not forget that it is more than proven that with this type of machine you can rebuild the smallpox virus “from publicly accessible information, in just six months and for about $ 100,000.”
Well, $ 100,000 was what it cost to make in 2017, in a few years that price could be (will be) ridiculously lower. It is such a true risk that the same industry has started generating control protocols.
At Twist Bioscience, the company that makes 10% of the world’s synthetic DNA, they told NPR that thoroughly review each client (and each sequence) to avoid unwanted problems. But it doesn’t seem like enough.
There are many things to do (and to think about)
In a sense, we are living a time analogous to the early days of computing. The transition from gigantic, slow and expensive machines to small, fast and affordable devices is, as I say, a reality. Cast requires new regulatory approaches.
Regulations to come, inevitably. The question is whether these regulations will come reactively (when the first big problem occurs) or will they arise from a social reflection that combine health security with the work of researchers that work precisely to contain these threats.
